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COURT UPHOLDS PARENTAL NOTICE
REQUIREMENT BEFORE ALLOWING
ABORTIONS ON MINORS
H.L. etc. v. Matheson, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981).
H.L. brought an action in state court to have a Utah statute1 re-
quiring parental notice as a prerequisite to the performance of an abor-
tion on a minor declared unconstitutional and to enjoin its
enforcement. 2 Utah law required the physician to notify the parents of
an unmarried minor "if possible' 3 before performing an abortion. In
this action, H.L. claimed to represent the class of unmarried minor wo-
men prohibited from terminating their pregnancies because of their
physicians' insistence on complying with the parental notification re-
quirement.4 The trial court found the statute constitutionally valid and
dismissed the complaint. 5 H.L. appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah
which affirmed the decision of the lower court.6
Last term, with Chief Justice Burger writing the opinion of the
Court, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court of
Utah. First, the Court held that H.L. lacked standing to challenge the
Utah statute as being unconstitutional on its face on the ground of over-
breadth. 7 Second, as the statute applied to an unemancipated minor
girl living with and dependent upon her parents, and making no claim
I Section 76-7-304 of the Utah Code provides:
To enable the physician to exercise his best medical judgment [in considering a
possible abortion], he shall:
(1) Consider all factors relevant to the well-being of the woman upon whom the abor-
tion is to be performed including, but not limited to,
(a) Her physical, emotional and psychological health and safety,
(b) Her age,
(c) Her familial situation.
(2) Notify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the abortion
is to be performed, if she is a minor or the husband of the woman, if she is married.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1953).
2 101 S. Ct. 1164, 1167 (1981).
3 The phrase, "if possible," was interpreted by the Utah courts to mean "if under the
circumstances, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, [the physician] . . . can ascertain [the
parents']. . .identity and location and it is feasible or practicable to give them notification."
H.L. v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907, 913 (Utah 1979) (footnote omitted).
4 101 S. Ct. at 1167 (referring to the unpublished opinion of the trial court).
5 Id. at 1168.
6 Id. (citing H.L. v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907 (Utah 1979)).
7 101 S. Ct. at 1169.
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or showing as to her maturity or as to her relations with her parents, the
Court found that the statute was narrowly drawn to protect only valid
state interests and did not violate any guarantees of the Constitution.8
I. BACKGROUND
H.L. was an unmarried 15-year-old girl who was living with and
dependent on her parents for support.9 Discovering that she was preg-
nant, she consulted a counselor and a physician.' 0 The counselor con-
curred in H.L.'s judgment that it would not be in her best interests to
notify her parents of her decision to have an abortion."I The physician
advised her that an abortion would be in her best medical interest. 12
However, because of the Utah statute, the physician refused to perform
the abortion without first notifying H.L.'s parents.' 3 H.L. consulted an
attorney, and then instituted an action to declare the statute unconstitu-
tional and to enjoin its enforcement.
H.L. was the only witness at the hearing held by the trial judge. 14
Her testimony consisted of brief answers to her attorney's leading ques-
tions which merely paraphrased her allegations.1 5 There was no direct
testimony concerning H.L.'s reasons for not wishing to notify her par-
8 Id. at 1173.
9 Id. at 1166.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 1167.
12 Id. at 1166.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1167.
15 H.L.'s testimony in response to her counsel's questions was as follows:
Q. At the time that the Complaint in this matter was signed, you were pregnant?
A. Yes.
Q. You had consulted with a counselor about that pregnancy?
A. Yeah.
Q. You had determined after talking to the counselor that you felt you should get an
abortion?
A. Yes.
Q. You felt that you did not want to notify your parents-
A. Right.
Q. -of that decision? You did not feel for your own reasons that you could discuss it
with them?
A. Right.
Q. After discussing the matter with a counselor, you still believed that you should not
discuss it with your parents?
A. Right.
Q. And they shouldn't be notified?
A. Right.Q. After talking the matter over with a counselor, the counselor concurred in your
decision that your parents should not be notified?
A. Right.
Q. You were advised that an abortion couldn't be performed without notifying them?
A. Yes.
Q. You than came to me to see about filing a suit?
A. Right.
PARENTAL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
ents. Since the statute applied to minors regardless of their reasons for
not wishing to notify their parents, 16 the trial court ruled that such rea-
sons were irrelevant to the constitutional issue H.L. raised.' 7
H.L. claimed to represent the class including all minor women who
are suffering unwanted pregnancies and desire to terminate the
pregnancies, but are unable to do so inasmuch as their physician will
not perform an abortion upon them without compliance with the paren-
tal notice provision.' 8 The trial judge found that H.L. was "an appro-
priate representative to represent the class she purports to represent." 9
He held that a minor's right to obtain an abortion or to enter into a
doctor-patient relationship was not unconstitutionally restricted by the
Utah statute.20
The statute was unanimously upheld on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Utah2' which concluded that it served significant state interests
which are present with respect to minors but absent in the case of adult
women.2 2 The court found that notifying the parents of a minor seeking
an abortion was substantially and logically related to the factors identi-
fied in Doe v. BolZon 23 as relevant to exercise of a physician's best medical
Q. You and I discussed it as to whether or not you had a right to do what you wanted
to do?
A. Yes.
Q. You decided that, after our discussion, you should still proceed with the action to
try to obtain an abortion without notifying your parents?
A. Right.
Q. Now at the time that you signed the Complaint and spoke with the counselor and
spoke with me, you were in the first trimester of pregnancy, within your first twelve
weeks of pregnancy?
A. Yes.
Q. You feel that, from talking to the counselor and thinking the situation over and
discussing it with me, that you could make the decision on your own that you
wished to abort the pregnancy?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you living at home?
A. Yes.
Q. You still felt, even though you were living at home with your parents, that you
couldn't discuss the matter with them?
A. Right.
Id. at 1167 n.6.
16 Id. at 1182 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
17 Id. at 1168. The ruling came in response to objections by H.L.'s counsel to state at-
tempts to inquire into her reasons on cross-examination.
18 Id. at 1182.
19 Id. at 1168.
20 Id.
21 H.L. v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907 (Utah 1980).
22 Id. at 912.
23 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The Utah Supreme Court rested its determination on the state-
ment in Doe v. Bolton that the physician's "medical judgment may be exercised in the light of
all factors physical, emotional, psychological, familial and the woman's age-relevant to the
well-being of the patient." 604 P.2d at 909 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92
(1972)).
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judgment in making an abortion decision because parents ordinarily
possess information relevant to the physician's medical judgment. 24 The
court also found that encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek
the advice of her parents in making a decision whether to bear a child
promoted a significant state interest in supporting the important role of
parents in child-rearing.2 5
II. THE OPINIONS
In his brief opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger failed to
reach the issue which H.L. presented, ze., whether the Utah statute was,
on overbreadth grounds, unconstitutional on its face. Instead, the ma-
jority found that since neither H.L. nor any member of her class alleged
or demonstrated that they were affected by the overbreadth of the stat-
ute, they do not have standing to advance that argument.2 6
After eliminating the issue of overbreadth, the Court was left only
with the narrow issue of the "facial constitutionality" of the requirement
that a physician notify parents "if possible," before performing an abor-
tion on their minor daughter.27 The Court further narrowed the issue to
the facts by considering only the case of the unmarried girl who is living
with and dependent upon her parents and who has made no claim or
showing as to either her maturity or her relations with her parents.28
The Court found that as applied to such minors, the statute serves the
state's interests in family integrity and adolescent protection.2 9
The Court also found that for the narrowed class, the statute serves
a "significant state interest by providing an opportunity for parents to
supply essential medical and other information to a physician. ' 30 With-
out citing any authority, the Court stated that "[a]n adequate medical
and psychological case history is important. '31 "Parents can provide
medical and psychological data, refer the physician to other sources of
medical history, such as family physicians, and authorize family physi-
cians to give relevant data. '32
24 604 P.2d at 909-10.
25 101 S. Ct. at 1169 (citing 604 P.2d at 912).
26 101 S. Ct. at 1169.
27 Id. at 1170.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1172.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. The Court's undocumented and oversimplified digression on the importance of an
adequate medical and psychological history to the physician about to perform an abortion
illustrates the opinion's uncritical reliance on slogans and conventional wisdom. The impor-
tance of a medical history is taken as an article of faith without even a citation to the opinion
of an authority let alone to any empirical evidence. There is no indication of what sequelae
to abortion might be avoided by obtaining medical history information from the parents.
1464 [Vol. 72
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Rejecting H.L.'s argument that the constitutionality of the parental
notice requirement was undermined because Utah allowed a pregnant
minor to'consent, without parental notice,3 3 to other medical procedures
related to pregnancy or childbirth, Chief Justice Burger attempt to dis-
tinguish between the state's interests in full term pregnancies and in
abortion.34 Again, citing no authority, the opinion asserted that the
"medical decisions to be made [in connection with a full term pregnancy]
entail few-perhaps none--of the potentially grave emotional and psy-
chological consequences of the decision to abort. '35
In Chief Justice Burger's view, the fact that the notice requirement
may inhibit some minors from seeking abortions does not provide a
The Court's view of possible detrimental consequences of abortion seems not to comprehend
that post-abortion problems may result not just from the physical abortion itself but also
from the way in which parents and others react to the abortion. Thus, even granting the
abstract importance of medical history, the physician must still decide whether the detrimen-
tal medical and psychological consequences avoided by parental notification will outweigh the
detrimental medical and psychological consequences which will result from notifying parents
when a minor does not wish them notified. Evaluating such tradeoffs is the essence of medical
judgment. The decision in Matheson substitutes a legislative for a medical judgment.
Whether or not the legislature should decide the question, it is perverse to rationalize a deci-
sion which prevents the exercise of medical judgment on the grounds that it enhances its
exercise.
33 Md. at 1173.
34 Id.
35 Id. (emphasis in original). Here the Chief Justice asserted an undocumented medical
"fact" to justify the state requirement of parental notice for abortion and not for pregnancy.
Evidently this statement is based on an early study (cited by ChiefJustice Burger elsewhere in
his opinion) of the emotional consequences of abortion in a sample of young unmarried pa-
tients. (The footnote states, "The emotional and psychological effects of the . . . abortion
experience are markedly more severe in girls under 18 than in adults. J. Wallerstein, et al.,
PsRchosocial Sequelae of Therapeutic Abortion in Young Unmarried Women, 27 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIA-
TRY 828 (1972). . . ." 101 S. Ct. at 1172 n.20). The assertion that abortion effects are more
severe among adolescents is wholly unsupported by the study cited and no such claim is made
by its authors. An elementary knowledge of research designed would indicate that at a mini-
mum such a conclusion would require a comparison between younger and older women having
abortions, which this study did not have.
Neither will the study support the ChiefJustice's broader generalization quoted in the
text above. The Wallerstein study is based on a convenience sample of 22 middle and late
adolescents who obtained abortions in California in the winter of 1969-70 and were willing to
be interviewed. Recognizing the limits of their sample size and possible biases in its selection,
the authors make no claims that their results can be generalized to any larger population. J.
Wallerstein, et al., supra, at 828. Moreover, if such generalizations were possible, the
population would be limited to women who obtained abortions under early California law
which permitted abortion when "there is substantial risk that [the pregnancy's]. . . continu-
ation would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother." Id. To the extent
that women have to qualify for abortion by having psychological difficulties, patients who
abort may be expected to demonstrate psychological difficulties after the abortion. Whether
women who have abortions have more psychological difficulties than they would have if they
were to give birth is effectively unascertainable. Where women choose whether or not to
abort a pregnancy, satisfactory comparisons addressed to this question cannot be made be-
tween the emotional reactions of women delivering and women aborting unless one makes the
1981] 1465
1466 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 72
valid basis for voiding the statute relative to the narrowed class. Citing
Harris v. McRae36 for the proposition that state action "encouraging
childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances" 37 is "rationally re-
lated to the legitimate government objective of protecting potential
dubious assumption that women who bear a child willingly react to pregnancy in the same
fashion as those who do not want the child.
One medical authority has summarized the literature on the psychological consequences
of abortion as follows:
The psychological aftereffects of [demand abortions] . . . are usually favorable----emo-
tional relief, indifference, and satisfaction. Depression, self-reproach, guilt, and/or im-
paired mental health are rare. It must, however, be noted that on some occasions severe
guilt has been reported as a result of moral and religious background of the pa-
tients. . . . It is thought that termination of pregnancy has little effect on the course of
many psychiatric conditions, and both remissions and exacerbations have been reported.
Manabe, Risks in Therapeutic Abortions, in RISKS IN THE PRACTICE OF MODERN OBSTETRICS
271 (S. Alajem ed. 1975) (citations omitted).
Chief Justice Burger puts the issue unfairly when he requires the legislature to balance
only between the emotional and psychological consequences of the medical decisions sur-
rounding pregnancy and delivery against all of the possible consequences of abortion. If the
determination is to be grounded in empirical evidence as the Chief Justice impliedly concedes
when he turns to such sources, then the favorable and unfavorable medical, social, economic
and emotional consequences of both abortion and childbirth in minors should be weighed in
the balance. Otherwise, the legislative outcomes are especially likely to be irrational. All
childbirth consequences must be considered because some unfavorable consequences of child-
birth may be avoided by abortion. For example, the well documented long term economic
consequences of early childbearing appear to be effects of having a child to raise. Card &
Wise, Teenage Mothers and Teenager Fathers.- The Impact of Eary Childbearing on the Parents'Personal
and Professional Lives, 10 FAM. PLAN PERSPECTIVES 199 (1978); Hofferth & Moore, Early
Childbearing and Later Economic Well-Being, 44 AM. Soc. REV. 784 (1979). Presumably such
effects may be avoided by abortion.
Even though he addressed the wrong issue, the Chief Justice's assertion makes it worth
noting some of the recent studies suggesting the detrimental psychological and emotional
effects of the medical decisions made at delivery. See M. KLAus & J. KENNELL, MATERNAL-
INFANT BONDING (1976); Affonso & Stichler, Exploratog. Study of Women's Reactions to Having a
Cesarean Birth, 5 BIRTH & FAM. J. 88 (1978); Doering & Enthwisle, Preparation During Pregnany
andAbilit to Cope with Labor and Delivery, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 825 (1975); Kontos, A
Study of the Eects of Extended Mother-Infant Contact on Maternal Behavior at One and Three Months, 5
BIRTH & FAM. J. 133 (1978). That mothers and families have strong reactions to the medical
decisions made during pregnancy and delivery is suggested by the popularity of Lamaze
childbirth, the interest in nurse midwifery and the growth of a consumer demand for less
medical intervention and greater maternal control and awareness at delivery. This move-
ment emphasizes both the medical and psychological benefits of a more family oriented and
"natural" approach to childbirth. Particularly, the movement has focused on the benefits to
maternal-child bonding which accrue from maternal awareness and close contact between
mother and child immediately after delivery. Such contact is often prevented by obstetrical
technique, hospital architecture and medical routine. Such contact is especially unlikely
when the child is sick or of low birth weight and requires placement in special facilities for
treatment. Kennell & Klaus, Caring for Parents of a Premature or Sick Infant, in MATERNAL-
INFANT BONDING 99 (M. Klaus &J. Kennell eds. 1976). This is significant in view of the fact
that teenagers have higher rates of prematurity than older women. Menken, The Health and
Social Consequences of Teenage Childbearing, 4 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 45, 49-51 (1972).
36 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
37 101 S. Ct. at 1173. (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 325). Possibly, when a minor
is pregnant, the situation is urgent given the medical risks and the social and economic conse-
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life,"138 Chief Justice Burger concluded that a state need not fine-tune its
statutes so as to encourage or facilitate abortions.3 9
In his concurring opinion joined by Justice Stewart, Justice Powell
accepted the Court's view that the Utah statute did not unconstitution-
ally burden H.L.'s right to an abortion.40 Justice Powell's opinion em-
phasized his understanding that the opinion of the Court left open the
question of whether the statute unconstitutionally burdened the rights
of a mature minor or a minor whose best interests were not served by
parental notice.4 1
Justice Powell joined in the determination that H.L. had standing
"only to claim that [the Utah statute]. . . is an unconstitutional burden
upon an unemancipated minor who desires an abortion without paren-
tal notification but also desires not to explain to anyone her reasons ei-
quences associated with adolescent pregnancy. See, e.g., Hofferth & Moore, supra note 35;
Menken, supra note 35.
38 101 S. Ct. at 1173. This reasoning amounts to an admission that the minor's access to
abortion is limited by parental notice. Utah did not concede this point and did not claim
that it required parental notice for the purpose of protecting fetuses. Utah claimed, first, that
notice to parents did not interfere with a minor's right to obtain an abortion, Brief for Appel-
lee at 6, and, second, that even if parental notice did burden ever so slightly, the right to
abortion it did not do so unda4y, Brief for Appellee at 7. Utah never claimed that it required
parental notice for the purpose of protecting potential life but rather that it was supporting
the interests of parents in being involved in a decision concerning a major surgical decision to
be performed on their daughter. Brief for Appellee at 13.
Consequently, Chief Justice Burger reached beyond the necessary logical underpinnings
for the Court's holding when he recognizes that Utah's action may not be neutral with respect
to abortion. In effect, the opinion permits a state to take actions intended to interfere with
obtaining an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). (During the first trimester "the attending physician, in consultation with his
patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment,
the patient's pregnancy should be terminated." Id. at 163). As authority for the acceptability
of non-neutral state intervention, the Chief Justice cites Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 324-25,
which decided that the state's interest in fetal life during the first trimester was sufficient to
permit the absence of state action (medicaid funding) to facilitate abortion. Since the holding
in Harris v. McRae rests on the determination that the state need not provide incentives for
abortion, use of that case here to provide authority for state interference in the process of ob-
taining an abortion is specious. For a discussion of the distinction between governmentally
imposed "burdens" and "benefits" in Harris v. McRae, see Bennett, Abortion andJudicial Review.-
Of Burdens and Benefts, Hard Cases and Some Bad Law, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 978, 1008-17 (1981).
This issue is discussed as it applies to Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), in Clark, Legislative
Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 953, 1011-24
(1978).
39 101 S. Ct. at 1173 (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 1173 (Powell, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 1173-74. Justice Marshall concluded that Justice Powell's emphasis constituted a
signal that a future party with standing to represent either the interests of mature minor or of
minors whose best interests are not served by parental notification could successfully chal-
lenge the Utah statute. Id. at 1179-80 n. 1. (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see text accompany-
ing and following note 123 infra, as to whether this invitation survives Justice Stewart's
resignation.
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ther for wanting the abortion or for not wanting to notify her
parents. '4 2 Thus, a majority of the Court specifically rejected the view
taken by H.L. and the trial court that the minor's circumstances are
irrelevant to the issue of whether her right to an abortion was unconsti-
tutionally burdened by the Utah statute.
43
Justice Powell found that numerous and significant interests com-
pete when a minor decides whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
On the one hand, the minor has a right both to make and effectuate a
decision to abort, and these rights may not be unconstitutionally bur-
dened.44 Opposing the minor's rights are the state's interests in encour-
aging childbirth rather than abortion and in fostering consultation
which will assist the minor in making her decision. 4 5 Justice Powell also
recognized a state interest in fostering the family and supporting parents
in the assumption of responsibility for the rearing and welfare of their
immature children. 46 "Particularly when a minor becomes pregnant
and considers an abortion, the relevant circumstance may vary widely
depending upon her age, maturity, mental and physical condition, the
stability of her home if she is not emancipated, her relationship with her
parents, and the like."'4 7 In Justice Powell's view, such circumstances
materially affect the right of a minor to make an abortion decision.48
Thus, a minor has no absolute right to make an abortion decision. Nor
does the state have an absolute right to require parental notice in all
cases without providing an "independent decisionmaker to whom a
pregnant minor can have recourse if she believes that she is mature
enough to make the abortion decision independently or that notification
otherwise would not be in her best interest."'49 Because she was per-
ceived as claiming an absolute right to make an abortion decision, H.L.
lost under this formulation.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens took as his point of de-
parture the holding of the Utah Supreme Court that the statute could
validly be applied to all members of the class including unmarried "mi-
nor women who are suffering unwanted pregnancies and desire to termi-
nate the pregnancies but may not do so because of their physicians'
insistence on complying with . . .[the parental notice requirement] of
the Utah Code." 50 Breaking with the opinion of the Court and with
42 101 S. Ct. at 1175.






49 Id. at 1177.
50 Id. at 1177 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting from the majority's opinion, id. at 1167).
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Justices Powell and Stewart on the standing question, Justice Stevens
felt the Court had the duty to answer the question decided by the Utah
Supreme Court.51
Justice Stevens reaffirmed his position taken in Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth52 that the state has a fundamental and sub-
stantial interest in the welfare of its young citizens which justifies a vari-
ety of protective measures which if applied to adults would be
unconstitutional. 53 In Justice Stevens' view, appropriate state action
dealing with abortion includes steps to ensure that the abortion decision
is wisely made by requiring consultation with a licensed physician or, as
here, by assuring the receipt of parental advice. 54 Justice Stevens found
that the Utah statute was constitutional without any exceptions for ma-
ture minors or those whose best interests are not served by parental no-
tice even though it may have "some impact upon a minor's exericise of
his or her rights. '55
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dis-
sented from the Court's holding.56 On the standing issue, the dissenters
agreed with Justice Stevens that the Court should answer the question
decided by the Utah Supreme Court.57 The dissenters found, however,
that the Utah parental notice requirement unconstitutionally burdened
a teenager's right to an abortion.58
On the standing issue, the dissent took the position that H.L. ade-
quately asserted her reasons for believing that parental notice would not
be in her best interests and, hence, did have standing to challenge the
statute as overbroad. 59 Since a state court acting under state law deter-
mined that H.L. represented the class of all "minor women who are
suffering unwanted pregnancies,"6 Justice Marshall argued that princi-
ples of comity and federalism required the Court to defer to that deci-
sion.61 Even if the federal law governing class actions were being
applied, Justice Marshall found, that the majority misapplied the law
when it disturbed the class definition approved by the trial court. 62 In
the dissent's view, when the Court determines that the trial court has
51 Id. at 1177.
52 428 U.S. 52, 101-05 (1976).
53 101 S. Ct. 1177-78 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting 428 U.S. at 101-05).
54 Id. at 1178.
55 Id. at 1177.
56 Id. at 1179 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 1184.
58 Id. at 1195.
59 Id. at 1181-82.
60 Id. at 1167.




abused its discretion in approving the class, the appropriate action is to
remand the case to permit the trial court to reconsider whether the
party is a proper and adequate class representative. 63
Justice Marshall next considered H.L.'s claim in light of his inter-
pretation of the Court's precedents and concluded that in view of the
constitutionally protected character of the abortion decision, the state
may burden the abortion decision only upon a showing that the restric-
tions advance "important state interests."' 64 Utah argued that the pa-
rental notice requirement did not hinder a minor's decision to abort an
unwanted pregnancy. 65 In support of his belief that the state's claim
was false, Justice Marshall cited several cases where parents have not
responded constructively and supportively when confronted with the
fact of a minor's pregnancy or her decision to abort.66
The dissent next addressed the interests which Utah offered to jus-
tify the parental notice requirement, namely that: (1) it permits the
parents to provide additional information to the physician; (2) it en-
courages consultation between the parents and the minor; and (3) it
preserves parental rights and family autonomy.6 7 Examining these
claims, the dissent noted that the most a parent is likely to be able to
contribute in the way of "additional information" would be facts about
the patient's medical history.68 Justice Marshall found it unlikely that a
minor mature enough to become pregnant and to seek medical advice
on her own initiative would be unable or unwilling to provide her physi-
cian with the background information requisite to an abortion deci-
sion.69 Moreover, the opinion noted that nothing bars a physician from
63 Id. at 1182-83.
64 Id. at 1185 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154).
65 101 S. Ct. at 1185 (citing Brief for Appellee at 9.)
66 101 S. Ct. at 1186. Justice Marshall would have the Court acknowledge that many
families are less than ideal and would not respond constructively to the information that their
daughter was going to obtain an abortion. Id. at 1187. The Court failed to deal with the
possibility that parents may react to the minor's decision with abuse, by withdrawing
financial support or by obstructing her decision to have an abortion. Presumably, in the
majority's view, such actions would be irrelevant since they would not constitute state action.
Amicus Brief No. 4 at 10-14 (argues this position for Utah). Also, the Court, ignoring the
distinction between action inhibiting abortion and action facilitating abortion reasoned that
Utah need not "fine-tune" its statutes to facilitate abortion. See note 38 & accompanying text
w pra.
67 101 S. Ct. at 1189-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 1189.
69 Id. No information was presented to the Court concerning either what facts the parents
were expected to provide or what the physician needed to know about a patient's medical
history before performing an abortion. Thus, it is possible that Utah has imposed a parental
notice requirement which burdens the minor's abortion decision without achieving any signif-
icant increase in the information available to the physician. This possibility does not trouble
the majority. Id. at 1172.
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consulting with the parents when he finds such consultation necessary. 70
Additionally, Justice Marshall argued that the Utah statute requir-
ing mere notice to the parents before the abortion may not achieve any
of the state's purposes. Such a requirement could be fulfilled merely by
a phone call from the physician moments before the abortion, preclud-
ing any parental involvement in the decision itself. The statute does not
require parental involvement in the decision, nor does it demand consul-
tation between the parents and the minor or parents and the physician.
Thus, the dissent found the statute underinclusive to the extent that its
aim is the transfer of information known to the parents and not avail-
able to the minor.7'
The state's claim that the parental notice requirement places no
burden on a minor's right to abortion was, in the dissent's view, inconsis-
tent with permitting a minor to consent, as Utah does, for other preg-
nancy-related medical care.72 In Justice Marshall's view, medical
procedures associated with completed pregnancy and delivery have po-
tential consequences at least as serious as the consequences of an
abortion.73
Finally, Justice Marshall rejected the state's claim that the'notice
requirement protects parental authority and family integrity in a man-
ner which is consistent with Court holdings in the area. The dissent
noted the incongruity in using as precedent decisions protecting the pri-
vacy of individual families from unwarranted state intrusion to justify,
in the case of abortion, state intervention to "resurrect parental author-
ity that the parents themselves are unable to preserve. '74 Assuming that
the statute applies to emancipated minors, mature minors, minors with
emergency health care needs, and minors whose best interest (as evalu-
ated by their physicians) indicate the advisability of an abortion, the
dissenters found the statute unnecessary to assure parents their tradi-
tional child-rearing role and burdensome to a minor's right to choose
with her physician whether to terminate her pregnancy.75
III. DISCUSSION
In Matheson, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, provided
none of the analysis which characterized the Court's earlier abortion
70 Id. at 1189.
71 Id. Of course, a statute which required parental participation in the decision would be
even more intrusive than Utah's statute.
72 Id. at 1189-90.
73 Id. Justice Marshall notes that these procedures may include amniocentesis, caesarian
section and other medical care related to pregnancy.
74 Id. at 1191 (footnote omitted).
75 Id. at 1194.
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cases. 76 The departure in Matheson from both the analytical framework
and the substantive holding of Roe v. Wade is complete and fundamen-
tal.77 A minor's right to decide to obtain an abortion was accorded no
special constitutional significance. Without meeting any articulated
tests for either importance or rationality, the interests put forward by
the state appear to outweigh H.L.'s personal interest in deciding to have
an abortion. The majority opinion made no attempt to enunciate the
calculus involved in identifying or weighing the competing interests at
stake.
A. H.L.'S STANDING
The question of standing is central to the result in Matheson. H.L.
was not permitted to challenge the Utah statute on the grounds of over-
breadth because neither she nor any members of her class had claimed
or offered proof that they were affected by the statute because of its
overbreadth. 78 As authority for H.L.'s lack of standing to allege over-
breadth, the Chief Justice quoted out of context from Harris v. MRae,79
where certain appellants were found not to be affected by the chal-
lenged statute at all and, hence, to lack standing.8 0 The Court inappro-
priately applied Harris to Matheson, where undeniably H.L. and the
members of her class are affected by the Utah statute.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall noted that the Court had found
criminal defendants to lack standing to challenge statutes on the
grounds of overbreadth when their activity falls in the statute's legiti-
mate core."' In first amendment cases, however, the Court's concern
that the exercise of fundamental freedoms not be chilled has led to per-
mitting facial challenges to the constitutionality of statutes on the
grounds of overbreadth without any proof that the party falls within the
alleged overbreadth.8 2 In Roe v. Wade the Court limited state interfer-
ence with first trimester abortions without requiring any proof that the
plaintiff was the first trimester of her pregnancy at any time during the
pendency of her law suit. This treatment indicated the Court's earlier
76 Seegeneralo L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 924-26 (1978).
77 The Chief Justice's citations to prior abortion cases serve the primary purpose of dem-
onstrating that the Court has never decided this precise factual question before. There is no
recognizable attempt to follow the reasoning of the Court's major abortion cases.
78 101 S. Ct. at 1169.
79 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
80 101 S. Ct. at 1169.
81 101 S. Ct. at 1180 n.2.
82 Id. Professor Tribe has noted an increased skepticism on the part of the Burger Court




willingness to treat abortion like first amendment rights in this respect.83
Matheson suggests that cases involving abortion statutes should be
treated more like cases involving criminal statutes.
B. H.L.'S INTEREST IN ABORTION
Chief Justice Burger's opinion failed to analyze H.L.'s situation.84
Conventionally, the Court examines the privacy interests at stake in a
given controversy to determine whether they have any special constitu-
tional significance and whether they are burdened by the state action at
issue.8 5 Then, the state interests are examined to determine whether
they are sufficiently weighty and rational to justify the burden placed on
individual interests. The outcome of this weighting and balancing is.
expressed in verbal formulations such as those found in Roe v. Wade.86
There, the Court determined that in the first trimester of pregnancy a
woman's right to an abortion was fundamental and could be impinged
only by a compelling state interest.87
The opinion of Chief Justice Burger gave no consideration or spe-
cial weight to any interest which H.L. or any minor she represented
might have in obtaining an abortion without parental notification. The
opinion merely noted that "[a]ppellant believed 'for [her] own reasons'
that she should proceed with the abortion without notifying her par-
ents." 88 In effect, H.L. was treated as a petulant teenager and her desire
for privacy vis-a-vis her family in connection with obtaining an abortion
was trivialized.
C. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN PARENTAL NOTICE
The Court's solicitous treatment of the state's interest was also not
analytical. 89 The Court never considered whether the state's purported
interests were genuine, nor did the Court examine whether the state had
chosen rational means to accomplish its purposes. Moreover, it refused
to permit H.L. to challenge the statute's purported purposes on the
grounds that it is overbroad.
83 Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe v. Wade was in part based on such a standing argu-
ment. 410 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84 101 S. Ct. at 1170-72.
85 See generally Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639 (1979) (Bellotti II); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152-56.
86 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87 Id. at 163.
88 101 S. Ct. at 1167.
89 In one merciful exception to its solicitous attitude toward the interests advanced by the
state, the Court ignored the state's contention that the statute furthers its legitimate interest




The members of the majority, writing separately, engaged in cus-
tomary legal reasoning and appear not to have abandoned the Court's
abortion precedents. 90 However, the opinions by Justices Stewart and
Stevens are also characterized by a superficial acceptance of the interests
advanced by the state.
D. IMPROPER STATE PURPOSE
In Matheson, for inarticulated reasons, the Court chose not to apply
the formula from Roe v. Wade that requires the state to assert a compel-
ling interest before taking action inhibiting a first trimester abortion. 9 1
Even if the fundamental nature of abortion fails to trigger some level of
skeptical analysis of the state's purposes, there is a strong argument that
the historical and political context of the enactment of Utah's abortion
statute requires a critical inquiry into the motives of the Utah legisla-
ture.92 When evidence of a motive to burden the exercise of a funda-
mental right is found, it may not render a statute automatically
unconstitutional, but it should trigger more than a cursory examination
of the purposes advanced by the state.93
Utah's previous abortion statute contained provisions requiring pa-
rental and spousal consent to an abortion. In declaring that statute un-
constitutional a federal district court stated:
It is clear, and the Court finds, that the overriding purpose and dominant
effect of these statutes is the wholly improper one of making the obtaining
or performing of an abortion in Utah extremely burdensome or impossible
in every case. Each and every challenged part of these statutes was in-
tended to and does contribute, when each statute is read as a whole, to that
improper purpose and effect.
94
Even with this historical background, the Matheson Court accepted the,
90 Writing for himself and Justice Stewart, Justice Powell acknowledged that the right to
make an abortion decision may not be unconstitutionally burdened and proceeds to balance
the individual and state interests involved in the case. 101 S. Ct. at 1173 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stevens' opinion was similarly forthright in its acknowledgement that the Utah
statute may have some impact on a minor's exercise of her right to an abortion but found that
the state is advancing an interest that is "fundamental and substantial." 101 S. Ct. at 1177
(Stevens, J., concurring).
91 410 U.S. at 154.
92 The Court has found unconstitutional legislative motivation in equal protection cases.
See Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960). Brest argues that the Court has also inquired into legisla-
tive motivation in Establishment Clause cases. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson. An Approach to the
Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 S. Cr. REv. 95, 100. Professor Clark argues
for application of the paradigm to fundamental rights cases. Clark, Legislative Motivation and
Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 953 (1978).
93 Brest argues that it would be inappropriate to hold that motivation invalidated a rule
but only that suspect motivation triggers a demand for extraordinary justification. Brest,
supra note 92, at 118.
94 Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 193-94 (1973).
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state's purported purposes at face value. The Court conducted no seri-
ous inquiry to determine whether-Utah's purposes explain the provisions
of the abortion statute.
If Utah's purpose was to assure that parents have an opportunity to
provide the physician with all relevant medical history to assist his med-
ical judgment, as the statute claims on its face, it would not give the
option of spousal notice for married minors. Rather, it would require
parental notice in all cases since parents are more likely than spouses to
have relevant medical history information. The purpose of making
medical history available to the physician, therefore, cannot explain the
statute's substitution of the husband for parents of a married minor.
If the statute were genuinely aimed at insuring the wisdom of a
minor's decision whether to bear a child by increasing the probability
that the parents are involved in that decision, the statute would require
notice whenever a minor receives pregnancy related care. This would
permit parents in appropriate cases to encourage a daughter to obtain
an abortion. The present statute, however, reveals Utah's bias because
it only brings in parents where there is a possibility they will influence a
daughter away from abortion.
Utah's bias against abortion also surfaces in special provisions mak-
ing it a felony of the third degree to "intimidate or coerce in any way
any person to obtain an abortion. ' 95 Were Utah's purpose to insure the
wisdom and voluntariness of the decision whether to bear a child, it
would be equally concerned about coercion and intimidation to prevent
an abortion. Yet, there is no such offense.
Utah's purpose of supporting family integrity may not account for
its statutory pattern. If family integrity is enhanced by notifying the
parents or spouse of a minor who decides to obtain an abortion, then
family integrity should likewise be enhanced by notifying the parents
and spouse of a minor about to obtain pregnancy related care. Yet,
Utah permits minors to consent to pregnancy related care without pa-
rental notice.96
Utah fails to indicate the meaning of family integrity which its stat-
ute is designed to enhance.97 The state may conceive of family integrity
in terms of parental authority, as the state's brief suggests,98 or in terms
95 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-312 and 76-7-314 (1953).
96 Id. § 78-14-5(4)(0 (1953).
97 See 101 S. Ct. at 1172. The Court's willingness to support family integrity without
clarifying what that might mean provides another example of the uncritical analysis in
Matheson.
98 Brief for Appellee at 23-26. To speak of preserving the family as a decision-making unit
in society may amount to the same thing as preserving parental authority to the extent that
family decisions are ultimately made by the parents.
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of family unity and harmony or both. When the whole of the Utah
statute is examined, the purpose of furthering parental authority is in-
consistent with the statute's substitution of spousal notice in the case of
the married minor, since a spouse does not stand in the same position of
authority regarding a married minor as parents stand relative to a
child.99 While the state might have an interest in reinforcing parental
authority, it would not have a comparable interest in reinforcing the
authority of the husband vis a vis the wife.
If Utah means that the statute is intended to increase family unity
and harmony, it becomes relevant to consider whether, in fact, this is
likely to result from the statute. It is unlikely that notifying either a
minor's parents or her husband that she intends to obtain an abortion
will on balance increase family harmony if the minor did not wish them
to be informed. Since no studies directly on point could be identified,
we are left with Justice Marshall's collection of cases in which parents
did not respond to a daughter's pregnancy in ways which promoted
family unity and harmony. 100 That Utah's statute is based on an un-
suppported belief that informing parents will increase family harmony,
suggests an ulterior motive.
The state also speaks of maintaining parents' right to know of sig-
nificant happenings in the lives of their children. 01 If this were Utah's
purpose, the spousal notice provision becomes incomprehensible since
the state does not have a comparable interest in exposing the secrets of
one spouse to the other.
The sincerity of Utah's motives might also be indicated by its con-
tention that the statute promotes the state's interest in the enforcement
99 The authority of parents over children is given legal recognition in a variety of contexts
including naming, consenting to medical care, determining religious education and domicile,
and the use of discipline. See generally 59 AM. JUR. 2d, Parent and Child §§ 8-24 (1981). Com-
pare 41 AM. JUR. 2d, Husband and Wi e § 11 (198 1). A husband generaly has no authority over
the wife and no legal right to chastise her physically.
100 Justice Marshall's footnote reads, in part, as follows:
See L.R. v. Hansen, Civil No. C80-0078 (Oct. 24, 1980) (CD Utah) (. . . minor alleging
parent expelled from home minor sister who disclosed facts of pregnancy and abortion);
see Women's Community Health Center, Inc. . Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 548 (Maine 1979)
(expect affidavits that some parents "will pressure the minor, causing great emotional
distress and otherwise disrupting the family relationship"); Baird. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp.
997, 1001 (Mass. 1978) (uncontested evidence some parents "would insist on an unde-
sired marriage, or on continuance of the pregnancy as punishment" or even physically
harm the minor); Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1388, n.24 (CA7 1978) (suggesting same
problems); In re Diane, 318 A.2d 629, 630 (Del. Ct. Ch. 1974) (father opposes minor's
abortion on religious grounds); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 908, 530 P.2d 260, 265
(1975) (parent thinks forcing daughter to bear child will deter her future pregnancies).
See Margaret S v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (ED La. 1980).
101 S. Ct. at 1186 n.24.
101 Brief for Appellee at 9-14.
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of its statutes regarding sexual behavior. 10 2 Since Utah has the same
interest in enforcing its criminal laws regarding sexual behavior whether
the pregnancy is carried to term or aborted, such a purpose would not
explain parental notice in the case of abortion only. 103 Moreover, when
the minor is married, there would seem to be little enforcement value in
notifying her husband that, in effect, she has had intercourse. That the
state should put forth such an obviously insincere purpose to justify its
abortion statute, reinforces the need to examine skeptically its other
purposes.
The overbreadth of Utah's abortion statute also bears on the state's
purposes. 0 4 Whether the state has an interest in reinforcing ties of fam-
ily unity and authority where such ties, as in the case of emancipated
minors, have already been severed must also be considered. 10 5 Assum-
ing the state has no interest in reinforcing the ties to their families of
emancipated minors, the overbroad statute cannot express such a state
purpose. Burdening abortion seems to best explain the state's inclusion
of the broadest possible class of minors. 10 6
The sincerity of Utah's motives might also be indicated by its con-
tention that the statute did not "impinge[] on a woman's decision Ito
have an abortion" or "place[] obstacles in the path of effectuating such a
decision." 107 Utah's failure to require parental notice for a minor to
receive pregnancy related care' 08 or treatment for veneral disease' 0 9 is
tacit recognition that such notice might delay or deter a minor from
receiving important medical care. Accordingly, state knowledge that
parental notice might place obstacles in the path of obtaining an abor-
tion may be assumed, making disingenious the state's assertions to the
contrary.
When Utah's purposes are seriously examined, it must be con-
cluded that 'the explanation for Utah's parental notice requirement is
102 Brief for Appellee at 28-30.
103 That Utah also permits a minor to consent to medical treatment for veneral disease
with no parental or spousal notice requirement also suggests its insincerity on this issue.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-39.1 (1953).
104 Had the issue been properly presented, a majority of the numbers of the Court evi-
dently would have found Utah's statute overbroad. See text accompanying note 123 infra.
105 That the Matheson Court did not question the necessity of exceptions from a parental
notice requirement for emancipated minors suggests that such a purpose would not be legiti-
mate. See 101 S. Ct. at 1181 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Id. at 1169 (citing L.R. v. Hansen,
Civil No. C-80-0078J (D. Utah, Feb. 8, 1980) (held Utah statute challenged in Matheson un-
constitutional if applied to emancipated minors)).
106 A similar argument can be developed for the other category of alleged overbreadth,
minors for whom parental notice is not in their best interest.
107 Brief for Appellee, H.L. v. Matheson, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981), at 9.
108 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5(4)( 0 (1953).
109 Id. § 26-6-39.1 (1953).
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that it was enacted for the purpose of restricting minors' access to abor-
tion. The credible political reality is that Utah, with its large anti-abor-
tion Mormon population, 10 enacted the parental notice requirement in
order to burden a minor's right to abortion rather than to accomplish
the worthy purposes advanced in the state's brief. If Utah had adopted
its abortion statute for the purpose of promoting family authority and
autonomy in protecting and advising minor children, the decision in
H.L. might be the right one. When the entire statute is examined in the
context of Utah's statutes on related matters, however, 1 it becomes un-
believable that the Utah legislature sought to promote family integrity.
Rather, the Utah statute seeks to accomplish indirectly through the
family what it may not accomplish through direct state intervention in
the minor's abortion decision. If the Utah legislature believed that pa-
rental notice would increase the number of abortions to minors, the pa-
rental notice statute would not have been passed. 112
The decision in Matheson makes the possibility more remote than it
already was that the Court will ever address the problem of improper
legislative intent in the enactment of abortion statutes.1 13 Such an anal-
ysis requires an examination of a statute in its total context, taking ac-
count of past legislation and the whole statutory scheme. The standing
holding in Matheson creates barriers to such analysis because it signals
the Court's unwillingness to look beyond the specific provisions affecting
the movant. An adequate motive analysis requires examination of re-
pealed statutes which no longer affect any parties before the court and
simultaneous examination of statutory provisions which do not affect
the same individual or the same class.' 14 When the Court refused to
110 It has been estimated that approximately 70 percent of Utah's population is Mormon.
See Nix to MX, TIME, May 18, 1981, at 28.
111 "See general,& UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-6-39.1, 76-7-312, 76-7-314 & 78-14-5(4)(o (1953).
112 Brest suggests that the ultimate issue involves a butfor test: "The ultimate question for
the court is whether an official body (for example, a zoning board) would have made a partic-
ular decision (for example, refusing to rezone for multiple-family use) at the time that it did,
butfor an unconstitutional motive (to keep blacks out)." Brest, Refections on Motive Review, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1141, 1142-43 (1978).
113 The Court's use of this paradigm generally is discussed in Brest, note 92 supra.
114 When H.L. was not permitted to challenge the statute on the grounds of overbreadth,
she was in effect prohibited from making a certain kind of challenge to the state's purposes.
Such a challenge may relate to several different theories under which the state action might
be invalidated. Here we are focusing on demonstrating that the state's "real" purpose is to
burden a minor's right to obtain an abortion. That the statute is overbroad relative to the
state's stated purposes might be one indication that the state's statement of purposes is insin-
cere. That the state's purported purposes cannot explain the statute's application both to
unmarried and to married minors might be another indication of insincerity, especially if the
alternative purpose can do so. Following its standing holding, however, the Court can refuse
to look at the statute's application to, for example, married minors because they are not
before the Court. Were the class composed of both married and unmarried minors, the Court
could find that they are not affected by the same provisions, and, hence, that the class lacks
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permit H.L. to allege overbreadth, it commited itself to looking at each
of the provisions and effects of a statute in isolation from the others and
in isolation from other statutes. It becomes difficult to challenge legisla-
tive intent, since one individual or class may not be able to challenge
simultaneously all provisions which together reveal the state's unconsti-
tutional purpose. The natural result of the Court's narrow approach to
standing is evident in Chief Justice Burger's opinion when he accepted
(and, at times, created) one ad hoc state purpose' 5 after another, with-
out examining either the state's consistency or rationality in purpose
across statutes or provisions.' 16 This approach transformed the Court
into the proverbial blind man "seeing" the elephant but missing the
picture plainly available to anyone who sees the whole.
E. SUPPORTING FAMILY INTEGRITY AS A STATE PURPOSE
The issue which H.L. presented to the Court is a concrete instance
of a fundamental societal tension between individual rights and the in-
tegrity of the traditional family. As embodied in the law, elements of
the traditional family system include the vesting of primary authority in
family matters to the husband and the exclusion of illegitimates from"
lines of paternal inheritance.' 17
The Court has rarely intervened in this conflict on the side of sup-
porting traditional family patterns. Rather, the Court has generally
found for the individual seeking rights at the expense of customary fam-
ily patterns. Abortion has been one arena for this conflict., The Court
has placed the ultimate decision whether to bear a child with the wo-
man rather than with her husband. 119 Similarly, Court decisions con-
cerning the rights of illegitimate children have tended to favor
individuals over traditional family patterns excluding illegitimates from
paternal inheritance.' 20
sufficient homogeneity. The effect of such reasoning, as Justice Marshall notes, mixes juris-
dictional and merits issues, 101 S. Ct. at 1181 n.5, in a manner which makes it particularly
difficult to challenge the purposes the state puts forth.
115 101 S. Ct. 1172-73.
116 See notes 31-39 supra.
117 Although it is doubtful that the Court understands the conflict in such terms, legiti-
macy is an important element of family integrity in certain family systems. The blurring of
distinctions between the family rights of legitimates and illegitimates represents a breakdown
in such a family system. &te generall Goode, Family Disorganization, in CONTEMPORARY SO-
CIAL PROBLEMs at 513 (R. Merton & R. Nisbet eds. 4th ed. 1976).
118 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179 (1972).
119 Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (The state
may not "'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is absolutely and totally
prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy.'") (quoting the language
of the District Court in 392 F. Supp. at 1375).
120 Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968). Even where the Court has held for the exclusion of illegitimates from pater-
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In clashes between the individual and the family, family integrity
has not been invoked by the Court to justify striking down the claims of
individual family members. In contrast, where the Court has promoted
family integrity and parental authority, it has been to protect the pri-
vacy of families from state intervention.' 2' In Matheson, the Court
mixed the reasoning of these two lines of cases by using family integrity
to justify state intervention into the family, thereby limiting the rights of
certain family members vis-a-vis others. The better view is that a pri-
vacy right accorded the family to protect it from state intervention can-
not justify state intervention in support of the family at the expense of
its individual members. In Matheson, the Court took what was fashioned
as a defensive weapon and turned it into an offensive one to be used by
parents to restrain the behavior of their daughters.
F. CONSEQUENCES
Matheson clearly established that non-emanicipated minors have no
right to an abortion without parental notice. 122 Whatever the merits of
that holding, the opinion's greatest difficulty is that it casts a pall over
the right to abortion without parental notice even for emancipated mi-
nors and those whose best interests are not served by parental notice.
Justices Powell and Stewart attempted to make it clear that a case in-
volving either of these groups would succeed on the merits.1 23 However,
Justice Stewart's resignation makes it uncertain that such a challenge
would succeed. Justice Stevens has already indicated that he would find
the Utah statute constitutional when applied to all minors. 124 The
Chief Justice and Justices White and Rehnquist were silent on the point,
but their denigration in the right to abortion and their solicitude toward
state interests in this context suggest that they would find such a statute
constitutional even when applied to those minors excluded from Mathe-
son's narrow holding. 125 Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun
clearly would find as they did in Matheson the application of a parental
notice statute to emancipated minors unconstitutional. 26 Conse-
quently, the outcome would depend on the position taken by Justice
O'Connor.
nal inheritance, it has rejected the opportunity to base its holding on a state purpose of en-
couraging legitimate family relationships. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
121 101 S. Ct. at 1191 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
122 101 S. Ct. at 1173.
123 Id. at 1173-74 (Powell, J., concurring).
124 Id. at 1179.
125 Id. at 1169.
126 &egeneraly 101 S. Ct. 1179-95.
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Given this uncertainty, states are free to legislate 127 parental notice
requirements for all minors seeking abortion. Anyone relying on the
Court's announced willingness to hold such requirements unconstitu-
tional as applied, for example, to emancipated minors takes the risk
that Justice O'Connor will not agree.
With such uncerainty concerning criminal penalties, counsel will
tend to advise conservatively individuals and institutions providing
abortions. Hence, parental notice statutes will be complied with.128
Consequently, to the extent that parental notice requirements constitute
a barrier to abortion services for minors,129 the realistic effect of Mathe-
son is to give the states maximum opportunity to erect that barrier re-
gardless of the minor's maturity or personal situation.
PHYLLIS A. EWER
127 At least four states have parental notification requirements. See MD. ANN. CODE art.
43, § 135 (1957); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-616 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
302 (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (Supp. 1974).
128 A national survey of abortion facilities conducted between October 1979 and March
1980 found that 44 percent required parental notice for patients age 15 or less, 33 percent for
those age 16, and 30 percent for those age 17. Torres, et al., Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and
4dolescents' Use of Family Planning and Aborlion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 284, 285-
86 (1980). In a related survey of minor abortion patients, 55 percent reported that their
parents knew they were obtaining an abortion. The younger the patient, the more likely her
parents were to know. Three-fourths of the parents of minors age 15 or less knew about the
abortion in advance. Id. at 287, 289.
129 Twenty-one percent of abortion patients, in the survey cited in note 128 supra, indi-
cated that they would still come to the clinic for an abortion even if their parents were noti-
fied. Twenty-three percent said that they would not come to the clinic if their parents were
notified. Id. at 287-89. The relationship between actual behavior and hypothetical responses
can not be determined. However, the percentages suggest the potential impact of Court deci-
sions legitimating parental notice requirements.
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